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This article explores the growing popularity of alternative presidential candi-
dates –those from outside the two dominant coalitions– in Chile from 2009 
to 2017. Following a theoretical discussion that focuses on the causes of 
voter discontent with the political establishment, we formulate four hypoth-
eses. We view support for alternative presidential candidates as a function of 
ideological detachment, declining political engagement, the economic vote, 
and socio-demographic shifts in the electorate. We use three pre-electoral 
Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys to present probit models and predicted 
probabilities. Our findings suggest that a distinct segment of Chilean voters is 
behind the rise of alternative presidential candidates. Younger and more edu-
cated voters who identify less with the traditional left-right ideological scale 
and political parties and suffer from economic anxiety –viewing the economy 
as performing well nationally while remaining pessimistic about their financial 
prospects– comprise this subgroup.
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Este artículo explora la creciente popularidad de los candidatos presidenciales 
alternativos –aquellos que no pertenecen a las dos coaliciones dominantes– en 
Chile entre 2009 y 2017. Luego de una discusión teórica que se centra en las 
causas del descontento de los votantes con el establishment político, formu-
lamos cuatro hipótesis. Consideramos que el apoyo hacia candidatos presi-
denciales alternativos corresponde a una función del desapego ideológico, la 
disminución de participación política, el voto económico y cambios sociodemo-
gráficos en el electorado. Utilizamos tres encuestas pre-electorales del Centro 
de Estudios Públicos para presentar modelos probit y probabilidades predichas. 
Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que un segmento específico de votantes chilenos 
está detrás del auge de candidatos presidenciales alternativos. Este subgrupo 
está compuesto por votantes más jóvenes y educados. Dichos votantes también 
se identifican menos con la escala ideológica izquierda-derecha y los partidos 
políticos tradicionales. A su vez, el subgrupo sufre de ansiedad económica, ya 
que consideran que la economía se desempeña bien a nivel nacional, mientras 











Este artigo explora a crescente popularidade dos candidatos presidenciais 
alternativos –aqueles que não pertencem às duas coalizões dominantes– no 
Chile entre 2009 e 2017. Após uma discussão teórica centrada nas causas do 
descontentamento dos eleitores com o establishment político, formulamos 
quatro hipóteses. Consideramos que o apoio à candidatos presidenciais alter-
nativos ocorre em função do desapego ideológico, da diminuição da participa-
ção política, do voto econômico e das mudanças sociodemográficas no eleito-
rado. Utilizamos três pesquisas pré-eleitorais do Centro de Estudos Públicos 
para apresentar modelos probit e probabilidades preditas. Nossos achados 
sugerem que um segmento específico dos eleitores chilenos está por trás do 
aumento de candidatos presidenciais alternativos. Este subgrupo está com-
posto por eleitores mais jovens e mais educados. Estes eleitores também se 
identificam menos com a escala ideológica esquerda-direita e com os partidos 
políticos tradicionais. Por sua vez, o subgrupo sofre de ansiedade econômica, 
já que consideram que a economia tem um bom desempenho em nível nacional 
sendo, no entanto, pessimistas sobre as suas perspectivas financeiras.
INTRODUCTION1
in the wake of the third wave of democracy in the 1990s, scholars praised the 
institutionalization of Chile’s party system. In more recent years, several stud-
ies have pointed to growing signs of distress in the party system. Although the 
1. We want to acknowledge support from Fondo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología FONDECYT 
1200317. We also want to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the RLOP editors for their com-
ments and suggestions.
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center-left Concertación/New Majority and center-right Alianza/Chile Vamos co-
alitions have received a majority of votes in all presidential and legislative contests 
held since 1989, the party system has become increasingly fragmented in recent 
years. Chileans vote in growing numbers for candidates from coalitions other than 
the Concertación/New Majority and Alianza/Chile Vamos, especially in legislative 
and municipal elections. In 2017, five presidential candidates from other than the 
two dominant coalitions received a combined 35% of votes. The legislature that 
emerged from that election is the most diverse since democratization. Concur-
rently, voter turnout has decreased substantially, and identification with political 
parties is at historic lows.
The era of two main alliances governing Chile might be coming to an end. 
Though the two main coalitions remain influential, challengers from alternative 
parties and independents have made meaningful electoral inroads. The evidence 
points to a realignment in the making. We contribute to a better understanding of 
the change taking place by answering the following question: What are the deter-
minants of support for alternative presidential candidates? We refer to alternative 
presidential candidates as all those not from the two dominant coalitions –regard-
less of their status as mavericks, outsiders, or representatives of minor parties. We 
use three Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) public opinion surveys from 2009 to 
2017 to explore the individual-level determinants fueling the rise of alternative 
presidential candidates– and the realignment of Chile’s party system.
In the next section, we discuss the theory behind the support for alternative 
presidential candidates and formulate our hypotheses, which we associate with a 
feeling of political discontent among voters. The third section reviews presidential 
elections in Chile following its transition to democracy in the early 1990s. After de-
tailing our data and methodology, we present the results from our statistical mod-
eling. Then, we analyze our findings. A final section summarizes our conclusions 
and offers guidelines for future research.
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES
Research on alternative candidates’ emergence and success has mostly focused 
on countries with an institutionalized two-party system, like the U.S. (Rosenstone, 
Behr, & Lazarus, 1984; Abramson et al., 1995; Hirano & Snyder, 2007). In the U.S., 
alternative candidates come from outside the two-party system and are the excep-
tion to the norm (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1984; Scarrow, 1986; Abramson et 
al., 1995; Hirano & Snyder, 2007). In Latin America, where party systems are more 
fluid, alternative candidates have successfully risen to power –though precisely 
because party systems are more fluid, the definition of an alternative candidate 
is subject to debate (Pérez-Liñán, 2007; Carreras, 2012, 2014). Notwithstanding 
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differences in the composition of party systems, the literature seems to agree that 
the rise of alternative presidential candidates –mavericks, outsiders, or minor 
parties– is a consequence of an existing party system’s shortcomings. In what fol-
lows, we discuss four potential explanations for the rise in support for alternative 
candidates.
Detachment from the left-right scale
The early literature on party systems identifies political divisions –cleavages– 
that explain inter-party competition (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). These cleavages are 
stable in time. In the U.S., a growing divide between voters and elected representa-
tives drives support for alternative or third-party candidates. Rosenstone, Behr, 
and Lazarus (1984), in perhaps the most thorough examination of third-party can-
didates in the U.S., view their rise as a consequence –among other factors– of a 
gap between the expected demands of voters and those supplied by established 
parties. Those divisions are policy-oriented and ideological. In their words, «some 
third-party voting is likely whenever there exists an ideological hole unfilled by a 
major party candidate» (1984, p. 130). Other studies have confirmed this finding 
(Magee, 2000; Lacy & Monson, 2002). Idridadson (2012) shows how non-com-
petitive extremist parties can shift the policy platform of established parties. Bar-
tels, Oliver, and Rahn (2016, p. 195) discuss how populist candidates are likely to 
emerge in U.S. presidential elections when there is a representation gap. 
In Latin America, studies have widely documented partisan and electoral dea-
lignment (Dix, 1989; Hagopian, 1998) and realignment (Carreras, Morgenstern, 
& Su, 2013). Whereas there is an ongoing debate concerning how to label party 
system change in the region, high electoral volatility –a good proxy of instability– 
is undeniable (Coppedge, 1998; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999). Thus, as parties and 
party systems are weak and fluid, candidates from outside the party system often 
abound. With its institutionalized party system stably aligned along with two domi-
nant coalitions, the case of Chile stands in between the more stable and predict-
able U.S. party system and the more fluid Latin American party systems.
While an ideological or policy gap commonly explains the rise of third-party 
candidates in the U.S., ideological factors might not necessarily account for their 
emergence elsewhere. On the contrary, a sense of disaffection regarding tradi-
tional ideological divisions of inter-party competition could also fuel support for 
alternative presidential candidates. In examining Latin America, Zechmeister 
(2015) signals that «among other factors, non-response to the left-right scale is as-
sociated with measures of disassociation and dissatisfaction: political disinterest 
and perceived lack of system support» (2015, p. 216). In Zechmeister’s view, Chile 
falls within «a handful of Latin American systems in which left-right identification 
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is rich in policy contents and very relevant to vote choice» (Zechmeister, 2015, 
p. 217). Yet, identification on the left-right scale in Chile has dropped from a high of 
73% in 1989 to 43% recently. While scholars continue to link vote choice for tra-
ditional coalitions to the left-right ideological divide (Navia & Osorio, 2015; Valen-
zuela, Somma & Scully, 2018), the same relationship might not apply to alternative 
presidential candidates. Since the left-right divide has resulted in «silent» shifts in 
an electoral competition elsewhere (Inglehart, 1977; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), 
and the rise of alternative presidential candidates coincides with a weakening of 
Chile’s traditional ideological division, we hypothesize that:
 H1. Vote intention for alternative presidential candidates is higher among 
those who do not identify on the left-right scale.
Declining political engagement
The second hypotheses partly stem from the discussion outlined above. The ra-
tional vote model stresses that citizens will be less inclined to support alternative 
candidates when they have a low probability of winning (Downs, 1957; Duverger, 
1967). This outcome is why majoritarian electoral systems, which favor two-party 
systems, are often viewed as the main barrier for third party candidates, as in the 
U.S. (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1984; Scarrow, 1986; Abramson et al., 1995; 
Hirano & Snyder, 2007).
In the U.S., support for third party candidates is mostly explained by voter dis-
satisfaction and discontent towards the partisan status quo (Rosenstone, Behr, & 
Lazarus, 1984; Lacy & Monson, 2002; Southwell, 2003). Voting for third party can-
didates is often described as a protest vote (Bowler & Lanoue, 1992; Southwell & 
Everest, 1998). Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1984) make the case that major 
party decay conditions support for third party candidates. In their view, «when the 
two political parties violate their implicit pact with the people, citizens can either 
sit out the election of abandon the major parties to support a third party alterna-
tive (…) A third party vote is a vote against the major parties» (1984, p. 126-127, 
emphasis in the original).
In Chile, there is growing evidence that voters are turning their backs on es-
tablished parties. Falling levels of partisanship (Luna & Altman, 2011; Navia & Os-
orio, 2015; Bargsted & Maldonado, 2018), electoral turnout (Contreras & Navia, 
2013; Bargsted, Somma, & Muñoz-Rojas, 2019), and interest in politics evidence 
this outcome (Etchegaray, Scherman & Valenzuela, 2019). Hence, we hypothesize 
that support for alternative presidential candidates is also a function of declining 
political engagement, as follows:
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 H2. Vote intention for alternative presidential candidates is lower among those 
who are politically not engaged–that is, do not identify with a political party, 
have not participated in previous elections, and have less interest in politics.
Economic vote
Research on industrialized democracies widely documents the economic vote 
theory (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007; Duch & Ste-
venson, 2008). Studies on Latin American cases replicate those findings (Lewis-
Beck & Ratto, 2013; Gélineau & Singer, 2015; Nadeau et al., 2017). The basic prem-
ise is that voters reward or punish incumbents depending on the performance of 
the national economy.
Although voters may punish an incumbent if economic performance is low, this 
does not necessarily mean that they will immediately back the traditional opposi-
tion. According to Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1984, p. 134, emphasis added 
by authors), «while the incumbent party suffers at the polls during periods of eco-
nomic decline (…) a failing economy may also make voters more inclined to abandon 
the major parties altogether. They are likely to be so inclined, especially if neither 
party appears capable of resolving the situation».
This reasoning applies to Latin America. The shift from state-led development 
to free-market policies alienated Latin American voters who perceived no dif-
ferences in the reforms adopted by ruling parties (Stokes, 2001; Roberts, 2014, 
2016; Lupu, 2016a, 2016b). In turn, this process made voters turn their backs on 
established parties and vote for political outsiders, as in Peru (Levitsky & Cameron, 
2003) and Venezuela (Weyland, 2003). Carreras (2012) also argues that unfavora-
ble socioeconomic conditions were strong determinants of support for outsider 
candidates in Latin American elections from 1980 to 2010.
Chile avoided programmatic dealignment because a coalition of center-left 
parties, the Concertación, «came into power in the aftermath to market reforms 
that had been adopted by conservative rulers» (Roberts, 2016, p. 70). The Concert-
ación consolidated the Pinochet era’s pro-market reforms while seeking redistri-
bution (Landerretche, 2014; Contreras & Sehnbruch, 2014). Pro-democracy and 
pro-authoritarian divisions, added to the presence of a binomial electoral system 
that generated incentives for parties to align along with two coalitions, structured 
inter-party competition during much of Chile’s era of democratization–at least 
more so than differences in the economic policies of governing coalitions (Tironi & 
Agüero, 1999; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003). Since the center-left and center-right 
coalitions implemented similar economic policies when in power, following the 
economic vote theory, we hypothesize that economic discontent explains support 
for alternative presidential candidates, as follows:
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 H3. Vote intention for alternative presidential candidates is higher among 
those with negative economic outlooks.
Socio-demographic shifts
The fourth hypothesis focuses on socio-demographic shifts in the electorate. 
We discuss two crucial factors: age and education. Support for alternative presi-
dential candidates might respond to a generational effect (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005). Since people are socialized politically in different times, generational vari-
ances in political behavior and electoral turnout inevitably emerge (Franklin 2004; 
Rubenson et al., 2004). As newer generations acquire different values, they are 
more likely to develop different political views and, presumably, other electoral 
preferences than older generations. Parties that represent older generations are 
less likely to attract younger voters successfully. Hence, alternative presidential 
candidates should be more likely to attract younger voters’ support because older 
voters have already stronger party affiliations and because younger voters have 
not yet developed strong party affiliations. 
Simultaneously, individuals with lower education levels should also be more 
likely to support alternative presidential candidates because they suffer more from 
economic anxiety (Corrales 2008). As a result, they constitute a brewing ground 
for alternative presidential candidates to reap electoral rewards (Mayorga 2006; 
Lupu, 2010). In this vein, Southwell (2003, p. 99) argues that a sense of alienation 
marks third-party voters. Thus, groups that are least likely to vote (e.g., younger co-
horts or individuals with lower education levels) might also be more likely to sup-
port third-party candidates. Our fourth hypothesis is as follows:
 H4. Vote intention for alternative presidential candidates is higher among 
younger voters and individuals with lower education levels.
In sum, we view support for alternative presidential candidates as stemming 
from four overlapping factors that point to voter discontent: detachment from the 
traditional left-right ideological divide, declining political engagement, economic 
dissatisfaction, and socio-demographic shifts in voter preferences. In the next sec-
tion, we present the case of Chile and then describe the data and methodology 
used to test our four hypotheses.
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ALTERNATIVE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN CHILE, 1989-2017
We view the rise of alternative presidential candidates as a function of over-
lapping factors stemming from voter discontent. In what follows, we discuss some 
of the primary changes in electoral behavior in Chile from 1989 to 2017.
Following the third wave, low electoral volatility levels explained Chile’s clas-
sification as a successful case of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring & 
Scully, 1995; Coppedge, 1998; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Siavelis, 2000; Angell, 
2003). While the party system traces its origins to the pre-1973 democratic break-
down (Scully, 1992; Valenzuela, 1995), Pinochet’s dictatorship shaped it into two 
main –pro-democracy and pro-authoritarianism– blocs (Tironi & Agüero, 1999; 
Torcal & Mainwaring, 2003). Not surprisingly, many studies treat Chile as a two-
party system, considering the two multiparty dominant coalitions as single parties, 
even if for simplicity purposes only (Dow, 1998; Carey, 2002; Siavelis, 1997; Sia-
velis, 2004; Londregan, 2007; Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Morgenstern, Polga-Hec-
imovich, & Siavelis, 2014; Bunker & Navia, 2015; Bargsted & Maldonado, 2018; 
Valenzuela, Somma & Scully, 2018). Although those studies also acknowledge 
Chilean politics’ multiparty nature, they use the stable two-coalition alignment as 
a shortcut to simplify their analysis, treating Chile as «a de facto two-party system» 
(Alemán & Saiegh, 2007, p. 253). 
Despite scholars initially labeling the post-transition party system as institu-
tionalized, recent studies warn about its weaknesses and about the decline in par-
tisan alignment and electoral participation. Luna and Altman (2011: 22) conclude 
that the party system is uprooted but stable, «in Chile, decreasing national-level 
electoral volatility combines with decreasing party roots in society, decreasing le-
gitimacy, and the weakening of partisan organizations as institutions.» Bargsted 
and Maldonado (2018: 53), who view the party system as being encapsulated, claim 
that the country’s sources of social change are «consistently and rapidly leading 
toward the extinction of mass-level partisanship in Chilean society.» Valenzuela, 
Somma, and Scully (2018) view Chile’s party system as reflecting both resilience 
and change. The resilience derives from «the long-standing divisions in Chilean so-
ciety along religious and class lines that created the party system.» However, de-
creasing partisanship and recent electoral reforms –a shift to voluntary voting and 
the end of the binomial electoral system– point to change (Valenzuela, Somma, and 
Scully, 2018: 157-161). Carlin (2011) associates falling levels of electoral partici-
pation to declining trust in institutions, confirming the trend of institutional weak-
ness identified in the Chilean political system. 
Chile transitioned to democracy due to a pact between the outgoing authori-
tarian regime and the incoming democratic opposition. Although the party system 
traced its roots to the period before the breakdown of democracy (Valenzuela & Scul-
ly, 1997; Montes, Mainwaring & Ortega, 2000; Angell, 2003; Torcal & Mainwaring, 
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2003), Pinochet’s dictatorship influenced the formation of two main coalitions (Ti-
roni & Agüero, 1999; Valenzuela, 1999; Valenzuela, Somma & Scully, 2018).
On the right, the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renew-
al (RN), composed of groups that supported the dictatorship, formed the Alianza 
(though, the coalition has changed names several times and goes by Chile Vamos 
since 2015). On the center-left, the leading parties that opposed Pinochet, includ-
ing the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist Party (PS), the Party for 
Democracy (PPD), and the Radical Party (PR), comprised the Concertación. While 
there have been some changes in the composition of the two coalitions, with the 
Communist Party (PC) joining the Concertación in 2013 to form the New Major-
ity coalition, the 1990-2018 period has been the most stable in Chilean history 
concerning multiparty democratic governance. Figure 1 shows the vote share for 
the Concertación/New Majority, Alianza/Chile Vamos, and alternative candidates 
(those not from the two dominant coalitions) for all presidential elections held be-
tween 1989 and 2017.
Figure 1. Vote share in first-round presidential elections, 1989-2017
The vote share of alternative presidential candidates includes all non-Concertación/New 
Majority or Alianza/Chile Vamos candidates. For th e Alianza in 2005, we combine the vote 
share of Piñera (25.4%) and Lavín (23.2%). We also add the vote share of Guillier (22.7%) 
and Goic (5.9%) for the Concertación/New Majority in 2017.
Source: Authors, based on Servicio Electoral de Chile.
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The two coalitions gained an overwhelming majority of votes in the 1989 presi-
dential election and remained dominant in all subsequent elections (see Figure 1). 
The Concertación/New Majority coalition won four consecutive presidential elec-
tions between 1989 and 2005 and has won five of the seven presidential elections 
held since 1989. The Alianza/Chile Vamos coalition won presidential contests in 
2009 and 2017.
The 1989 presidential election replicated the Yes/No divide of the 1988 plebi-
scite. The Alianza candidate was Hernán Büchi, Pinochet’s Finance Minister (1985-
1989). Patricio Aylwin (PDC), a renowned politician, ran on the platform of the 
Concertación. An alternative candidate, Francisco Javier Errázuriz, also entered 
the race. Errázuriz, a conservative who voted for Pinochet in 1988 but claimed that 
his heart was set on the No vote (against Pinochet staying in power), appealed to 
center-right voters. In the end, Aylwin comfortably won the election (55.2%). Büchi 
(29.4%) came in second, and Errázuriz ended in third place (15.4%).
The success of the Aylwin’s government (1990-1994) gave the Concertación 
an advantage in the 1993 election. The coalition’s candidate was Eduardo Frei 
(PDC), son of a former homonymous president (1964-1970). Arturo Alessandri, an 
independent senator from a well-known political family, ran as the Alianza candi-
date. There were four alternative presidential candidates. José Piñera, a conserva-
tive who served as Minister of Labor (1978-1980) and Mining (1980-1981) under 
Pinochet, ran as an independent. The other three alternative candidates were 
Manfred Max Neef, Eugenio Pizarro, and Cristián Reitze, each running on different 
platforms to the left of the Concertación, the so-called extra-parliamentary left. 
Frei won with a comfortable 58%, while Alessandri received 24.4%, marking the 
worst electoral performance by an Alianza/Chile Vamos presidential candidate in 
the post-authoritarian period. The combined electoral support for alternative can-
didates reached 17.6% votes.
The 1999 presidential election was the most competitive in the post-author-
itarian-period. An economic recession in 1997 sank Frei’s approval, making the 
race tricky for the incumbent Concertación candidate, Ricardo Lagos (PPD). The 
Alianza candidate was Joaquín Lavín (UDI), a popular conservative mayor from Las 
Condes, a wealthy municipality. There were three alternative candidates to the 
left of the Concertación: Gladys Marín (PC), Tomás Hirsch (Humanist Party), and 
Sara Larraín (Ecologist Party). A fourth alternative candidate, former PDC senator 
Arturo Frei Bolívar, campaigned on a similar platform as Errázuriz in 1989 (with 
televised ads that showed him alongside Pinochet and the senior president Frei). 
Lagos and Lavín received 47.9% and 47.5% of votes, respectively, consolidating the 
Concertación and Alianza electoral dominance. The four alternative candidates’ 
combined first-round ballot was the lowest in the post-transition era: barely 4.5%. 
The razor-sharp vote forced the first presidential run-off in Chilean history, where 
Lagos clinched a narrow victory with 51.3%.
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In 2005, Michelle Bachelet became the Concertación candidate after gaining 
popularity as minister of Health (2000-2002) and National Defense (2002-2004), 
during the Lagos presidency. The Alianza split between two presidential candi-
dates. Joaquín Lavín ran again on the platform of the UDI, while RN nominated 
Sebastián Piñera, a former senator and billionaire. Whereas the center-right can-
didates received a combined first-round vote of 48.6%, Bachelet became Chile’s 
first female president with 53.5%, after defeating Piñera in the run-off. There was a 
single alternative candidate, leftist Tomás Hirsch (5.4%), who had also run in 1999.
The 2009 election brought an end to twenty years of Concertación govern-
ments. Although president Bachelet (2006-2010) finished her term with an 80% 
record-breaking approval rating, amidst an economic recession, the Concertación 
candidate, former president Frei (1994-2000), did not benefit from her popular-
ity. The center-right opposition rallied behind Piñera, who offered an option to 
years of wear-and-tear of Concertación governments. Two alternative leftwing 
candidates also helped undermine Frei. The PC and other leftist parties nominated 
Jorge Arrate, a former PS leader. At the same time, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a 
former PS deputy, ran as an independent and received an unprecedented 20.1% in 
the first-round vote. Frei achieved 29%, the lowest vote share on record for a Con-
certación presidential candidate until then. Piñera won the presidency in a run-off 
against Frei with 51.6%.
In 2013, support for alternative candidates grew again. In addition to the Con-
certación/New Majority and Alianza candidates, there were seven alternative can-
didates. The bulk of support for alternative party alternatives went to two young 
candidates: center-left Marco Enríquez-Ominami and center-right Franco Parisi, 
who received 10.9% and 10.1%. The combined vote share for alternative candi-
dates (28.2%) exceeded the vote share for the Alianza candidate, Evelyn Matthei, 
in the first-round vote (25%). Bachelet (62.2%) easily won the election after de-
feating Matthei (37.8%) in the run-off.
In 2017, support for alternative party presidential candidates reached its high-
est mark. In the first-round vote, the traditional coalitions Alianza/Chile Vamos and 
Concertación/New Majority received a combined vote share of 65.2%. The New Ma-
jority split before the election. As a result, the PDC nominated senator Carolina Goic 
(5.9%), and center-left New Majority parties did the same with senator Alejandro 
Guillier (22.7%). There were also five alternative candidates representing all political 
sectors, from the ultra-conservative José Antonio Kast to ultra-leftist Eduardo Ar-
tés. They all received a combined 34.8% of the votes. Leftist Beatriz Sánchez, from 
the newly formed Frente Amplio (Broad Front), an emerging left-wing coalition, end-
ed in third place, with 20.3%, and fell short of defeating Guillier (22.7%) for a spot in 
the second-round vote. In the run-off, Piñera defeated Guillier by 54.5% to 45.4%. 
The Chilean case reveals two parallel trends. On the one hand, the center-right 
and center-left coalitions remain electorally dominant. Both continue winning 
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majorities in presidential and legislative elections. Only candidates from those 
coalitions have made it to presidential run-offs, and the Concertación and Alianza 
remain the two largest parliamentary blocs. On the other hand, the decline of the 
main coalitions is undeniable, evidenced by decreasing partisanship and electoral 
support. The decay of traditional alliances has deepened as support for alternative 
presidential candidates grows. 
Table 1 shows the vote share of alternative presidential candidates from 1989 
to 2017, which includes a column with the definition of the type of candidate. 
We follow Carreras’ (2012: 1457) typology to label alternative presidential can-
didates–mavericks, outsiders, and minor parties. The descriptive table reveals a 
U-shape pattern in support for alternative presidential candidates: relatively high 
in the early post-transition years (1989 and 1993), low during the peak of two-
coalition rule (1999 and 2005), and increased again in more recent election cycles 
(2009, 2013, and 2017). 
Table 1. Alternative presidential candidates in Chile, 1989-2017
Year Candidate(s) Vote Share (%) Classification
1989 1. Francisco Javier Errázuriz 15.4 Outsider
1993
1. José Piñera
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Year Candidate(s) Vote Share (%) Classification
2017
1. Beatriz Sánchez














* We label José Piñera and Jorge Arrate differently from Carreras (2012: 1417). In 1993, 
José Piñera –who had previously run for local councilmember as a UDI candidate in the 
municipality of Conchalí– ran as independent after resigning from the party. In 2009, Jorge 
Arrate, a former Socialist, was the Communist Party’s official candidate, though he was not 
a member of that party.
Source: Authors, based on Servicio Electoral de Chile and Carreras (2012).
Support for alternative presidential candidates runs parallel to broader trans-
formations in Chile’s electorate. Figure 2 shows turnout in presidential elections 
measured as the percentage of the voting-age population. The data portrays a clear 
downward trend. In 1989, 84.6% of the voting-age population went to the polls. 
That number fell to 46.7% in the first-round vote of 2017. On average, turnout in 
presidential elections fell by 6.3 percentage points in every presidential election 
from 1993 to 2017. Figure 2 also presents the effective number of parties (ENP) 
–or in this case, candidates– for the same timeframe (1989-2017). As the plot re-
veals, the ENP was relatively stable in the elections of 1989, 1993, and 1993 (with 
a mean of 2.3). Starting in 2005, however, the ENP surpasses 3. Since the Alianza 
ran with two different candidates in 2005, it was not until 2009 that alternative 
candidates broke with the two-coalition system. From that moment on, the ENP in 
presidential elections averages 3.5, peaking in 2017 with 4.2.
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Figure 2. Turnout and effective number of parties in presidential elections, 
1989-2017
Source: Authors, based on Contreras and Navia (2013) and Servicio Electoral de Chile.
Public opinion surveys also portray the change in the ideological and parti-
san attachment in Chile–both of which reveal a significant decay (see Figure 3). 
In 1993, 71.2% of respondents identified with a political party2. This figure fell to 
25% in 2017. Respondents who identify on the left-right ideological scale reveal 
a similar trend. In 1989, 72.3% identified with the scale. In the pre-electoral sur-
vey of 1993, this number even grew to 75.6%. While those who identified with the 
scale from 1999 to 2009 still represented over half of Chile’s adult population, in 
the polls covering the 2013 and 2017 election, only 43% of respondents identified 
on the left-right divide.
2. See Valenzuela, Somma, and Scully (2018: 140) for a detailed discussion concerning how respon-
dents might have interpreted the party identification question in 1993.
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Figure 3. Selected survey questions for partisanship and ideological 
identification
Source: Authors, based on the Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys (November-December 
1989, November 1993, September-October 1999, October-November 2005, October 
2009, September-October 2013, and September-October 2017).
In sum, there is U-shaped evolution in support for alternative presidential can-
didates, with higher vote shares in the early years of post-authoritarian democ-
racy (1989 and 1993), lower support as democracy consolidated (1999 and 2005), 
and more backing in the most recent elections (2009, 2013 and 2017). In turn, this 
distribution has coincided with falling levels of electoral turnout, partisanship, and 
ideological identification, and with an increase in the effective number of presiden-
tial candidates.
Since the growing presence of alternative presidential candidates in Chile 
might be a sign of realignment, we view their rise as a function of overlapping fac-
tors stemming from voter discontent in four main areas. We sustain that a grow-
ing alienation with the post-authoritarian ideological divide, declining political en-
gagement, economic dissatisfaction, and socio-demographic shifts all play a role in 
explaining the increasing popularity for candidates who do not campaign on tradi-
tional coalition platforms.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use public opinion surveys from the Centro de Estudios Públicos (Center for 
Public Studies, or CEP). The CEP has regularly published surveys since the mid-
1980s. It also has one of the most anticipated pre-election polls in the country. We 
collected data from three pre-electoral surveys (October 2009, September-Octo-
ber 2013, and September-October 2017) representing the country’s adult popu-
lation. The fieldwork of all surveys, on average, was conducted a couple of months 
before the election3. We use the three surveys from 2009 to 2017 to present pro-
bit models to test our hypotheses, focusing on the individual-level determinants of 
support for alternative presidential candidates.
We focus on the elections from 2009 to 2017 for two reasons. First, there is 
missing data for crucial socio-demographic variables in previous polls. Second, 
few respondents supported alternative candidates (N < 100) in 1999 and 2005 to 
conduct meaningful statistical analysis.
The probit estimations contrast the support of alternative presidential can-
didates with that of the Alianza/Chile Vamos and Concertación/New Majority 
candidates. The dependent variable equals one (1) when the respondent says she 
will vote for an alternative presidential candidate and zero (0) when voting for an 
Alianza/Chile Vamos or Concertación/New Majority candidate. We code all other 
responses, including blank and null votes, as missing values.
Our first hypothesis centers on ideological detachment. We use self-placement 
on the left-right ideological scale. The CEP surveys ask the following question: As 
you know, traditionally in our country people define political positions as closer to the 
left, to the center or to the right. In this card we represent the different political po-
sitions. Please, tell me, which one do you identify with more or which position do you 
like most?4. Respondents are given a five-point scale, which ranges from left (1) to 
right (5). They can also indicate if they are «independent» or if they do not identify 
with any position on the scale. Hence, we recode a dummy variable for ideology. 
Respondents who identify on the left-right ideological scale equal one (1). Those 
who are either independent or do not identify equal zero (0). We code all other 
responses, including cases in which respondents do not know or fail to respond, as 
missing values.
3. The first-round elections were held as follows: December 13, 2009; November 17, 2013, and No-
vember 19, 2017. 
4. Translated by the authors: Como Ud. sabe, tradicionalmente en nuestro país la gente define las posi-
ciones políticas como más cercanas a la izquierda, al centro o a la derecha. En esta tarjeta representamos 
las distintas posiciones políticas. Por favor, indíqueme, ¿con cuál Ud. se identifica más o con cuál posición 
simpatiza Ud. más?
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For our second hypothesis that focuses on political engagement, we use indica-
tors of partisanship, electoral participation, and interest in politics. Partisanship is 
a dummy variable. Respondents who sympathize with a political party equal one (1) 
and those who do not equal zero (0). We measure electoral participation by report-
ed participation in past presidential elections. A dummy variable equals one (1) if a 
respondent voted in the latest presidential election and zero (0) if she did not vote. 
The CEP surveys also ask if respondents are interested in politics. The question 
is: How interested are you in politics?5. The respondent can signify four alternatives 
that range from «Not at all interested» to «Very interested.» We rescale the values 
to range from zero (0) for those who are not interested to one (1) for those who are 
very interested in politics. We code all other responses as missing values.
We rely on independent variables that focus on perceptions of economic per-
formance for our third hypothesis. We use the following question for national 
economic outlook: According to this scale, how would you rate the current economic 
situation in the country?6. We also use this question regarding future pocketbook 
views: In the next 12 months, how do you think your economic situation will be?7. The 
answers, which range from negative to positive values, are rescaled to range from 
zero (0) to one (1), respectively. Since the CEP surveys do not always ask the same 
questions, we cannot contrast future national economic views and pocketbook 
assessments due to data constraints.
Our models also include socio-demographic variables. We use two –education 
and age– for our fourth hypothesis. Research in Latin America (Carlin et al., 2015) 
and Chile (Navia, Morales, & Briceño, 2009; Navia & Morales, 2010) has discussed 
how socio-demographic variables impact vote choice. The first one is education. 
We recode a continuous scale that ranges from zero (0) to one (1) for individuals 
who have primary, secondary, and tertiary education as their highest education 
level. The models also include the respondents’ age, a continuous variable ranging 
from 0.18 to 1. We include two socio-demographic controls. First, a dummy for the 
region of residence. Respondents who reside in the Metropolitan Region, where 
Santiago, the capital, is located along with 40% of the population, equal one (1). 
Residents from elsewhere in the country equal (0). The respondent’s sex is the sec-
ond control. The dummy variable equals zero (0) for men and one (1) for women. 
All models include survey fixed effects (with dummy variables for the year in which 
each survey was conducted), but we omit those coefficients from the tables to sim-
plify the visualization of the data. Table 2 summarizes our variables.
5. Translated by the authors: ¿Cuán interesado está Ud. en la política?
6. Translated by the authors: De acuerdo a esta escala, ¿cómo calificaría Ud. la actual situación económi-
ca del país?
7. Translated by the authors En los próximos 12 meses, ¿cómo cree Ud. que será su situación económica?
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Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics used for regression analysis
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote Intention for Alternative Candidates 3,432 0.252 0.434 0 1
Ideological Identification (Dummy) 3,287 0.555 0.497 0 1
Party Identification 3,342 0.389 0.488 0 1
Voted in Last Presidential Election 3,413 0.725 0.447 0 1
Interest in Politics 3,405 0.371 0.333 0 1
National Economy (Present) 3,418 0.469 0.352 0 1
Pocketbook Economy (Future) 3,418 0.702 0.296 0 1
Education 3,432 0.836 0.671 0 1
Age 3,432 0.478 0.179 0.18 0.98
Capital 3,432 0.360 0.480 0 1
Women 3,432 0.578 0.494 0 1
Source: Authors, based on the Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys (October 2009, 
September-October 2013, and September-October 2017).
RESULTS
We now turn to examine the individual-level determinants of support for alter-
native presidential candidates from 2009 to 2017. We divide the inferential analy-
sis into two sections. The first section presents the probit estimations results, and 
the second one plots predicted probabilities for the primary outcomes. In the esti-
mations, column 1 solely displays the effect of socio-demographic variables. Then, 
column 2 shows the impact of ideological identification. Column 3 exhibits politi-
cal engagement (partisanship, past electoral turnout, and interest in politics), while 
column 4 includes the variables for national and pocketbook economic outlooks. 
Since ideological identification is highly correlated to party identification (> 0.6), 
we present two full models (columns 5 and 6) to avoid multicollinearity.
Table 3 presents the results of the probit estimations (we omit the fixed effects 
for the year of the election from the output). The influence of ideological identifi-
cation is consistent between estimates. In both models (M2 and M5), the effect is 
negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). This result translates into respond-
ents who do not identify with the ideological scale supporting alternative candi-
dates in more significant numbers.
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The variables for political engagement reveal uneven effects. Foremost, the output 
for party identification is negative and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level in 
the individual and full models. Identifying with a political party decreases the like-
lihood of voting for an alternative presidential candidate. Simultaneously, voting 
in the previous presidential election is negative and statistically significant in the 
second full model (p<0.05 level). This result tentatively translates to alternative 
presidential candidates’ supporters as voting in fewer numbers in the past. Mean-
while, displaying interests in politics is not statistically significant, making it a weak 
predictor of alternative presidential candidates’ support.
Table 3. The determinants of vote intention for alternative presidential 
candidates in Chile





Party Identification -0.288*** -0.286***
  (0.053) (0.054)
Voted in Last Election -0.118* -0.117* -0.146**
  (0.063) (0.065) (0.064)
Interest in Politics -0.0648 -0.0789 -0.0628
  (0.084) (0.086) (0.086)
National Economy 0.115 0.140* 0.149**
(Present) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073)
Pocketbook Economy -0.263*** -0.257*** -0.267***
(Future) (0.084) (0.087) (0.087)
Education 0.293*** 0.340*** 0.363*** 0.283*** 0.365*** 0.355***
  (0.079) (0.083) (0.085) (0.081) (0.087) (0.086)
Age -1.486*** -1.497*** -1.364*** -1.590*** -1.415*** -1.420***
  (0.150) (0.155) (0.180) (0.156) (0.187) (0.185)
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital 0.056 0.051 0.058 0.052 0.044 0.058
  (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
Women 0.012 -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.011 -0.001
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051)
Constant -0.185* -0.096 -0.077 0.007 0.076 0.094
  (0.108) (0.113) (0.113) (0.132) (0.138) (0.136)
McFadden R2 0.05 0.056 0.063 0.053 0.062 0.068
Nagelkerke R2 0.081 0.091 0.102 0.087 0.101 0.109
N 3,432 3,287 3,298 3,311 3,140 3,191
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). Entries are unstandardized probit 
estimates, with standard errors in parenthesis.
All models include survey fixed effects that we omit as part of the output.
Source: Authors, based on the Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys (October 2009, 
September-October 2013, and September-October 2017).
The economic outlook variables reveal compelling findings. National eco-
nomic views only have a negative impact that is significant in the second full model 
(p<0.05 threshold). This outcome signifies that individuals with good evaluations 
of the country’s economy are more likely to vote for alternative presidential candi-
dates. Conversely, future pocketbook assessments are negative and significant at 
the p<0.01 level in the individual and full models. In other words, individuals who 
are optimistic about their future personal economic situation are less likely to sup-
port alternative presidential candidates.
The effect of the socio-demographic variables is consistent across models. The 
impact of education is positive and significant at the p<0.01 level. This outcome 
implies that individuals who have more years of education vote in more significant 
numbers for alternative presidential candidates. Age is consistently negative and 
significant at the p<0.01 threshold, which indicates that being young increases the 
likelihood of voting for alternative presidential candidates. The probit estimations 
also reveal no substantial differences stemming from the controls for the region of 
residence and gender.
In short, the probit models show that, on the one hand, ideological identifica-
tion, party identification, economic pocketbook perceptions, education, and age 
are robust predictors of support for alternative presidential candidates. One the 
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other hand, the national economic outlook and voting in past elections are signifi-
cant in some models.
Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities for vote intention for alternative 
presidential candidates by selected indicators. The first row plots the results for 
ideological identification and party identification. The figure confirms how indi-
viduals who do not identify ideologically or identify with a political party are sub-
stantially more inclined to support alternative presidential candidates. The second 
row uses the two full models (M5 and M6) to portray support for alternative presi-
dential candidates by past vote. The results indicate that individuals who did not 
vote are slightly more inclined to support alternative presidential candidates in the 
polls–although the difference is narrower in comparison to ideological and parti-
san identification.
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities by selected indicators
95% confidence intervals.
APC = Alternative presidential candidates.
Source: Authors, based on the Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys (October 2009, 
September-October 2013, and September-October 2017).
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Figure 4 also reveals the extent to which there are differences between na-
tional and pocketbook outlooks. Individuals with better perceptions of the na-
tional economy are somewhat more inclined to vote for alternative presidential 
candidates. Conversely, those who have an optimistic view regarding their future 
economic situation are notoriously less inclined to support candidates not run-
ning on Chile’s traditional coalitions. The last row provides results for education 
and age. The plot reveals how more years of education tend to increase voting for 
alternative presidential candidates. Similarly, support for alternative presidential 
candidates is notably less prevalent among older voters.
Figure 4 (continued). Predicted probabilities by selected indicators
95% confidence intervals.
APC = Alternative presidential candidates.
Source: Authors, based on the Centro de Estudios Públicos surveys (October 2009, 
September-October 2013, and September-October 2017).
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DISCUSSION 
The models above provide a statistical snapshot of the determinants of sup-
port for alternative presidential candidates in Chile from 2009 to 2017. The output 
reveals the extent to which voting for candidates not running on the platform of 
traditional coalitions stems from the four sources of voter discontent previously 
defined.
In the first hypothesis, we expected that not identifying with Chile’s conven-
tional left-right ideological divide increased support for alternative presidential 
candidates. The empirical results fall in line with this assumption, as identifying 
ideologically seemingly decreases support for alternative presidential candidates 
in the individual and full models. Alternative candidates receive stronger support 
among those who do not identify on the ideological scale. Our findings comple-
ment previous findings, using data from before automatic registration and volun-
tary voting, that report that lower trust in political parties induces higher absten-
tion (Carlin, 2011). As all voters have been automatically registered since 2012, 
they can now easily opt between abstaining or casting a ballot for an alternative 
candidate. 
In the second hypothesis, we postulated that individuals who do not identify 
with parties, did not participate in the past presidential election, and are less inter-
ested in politics are more likely to support alternative presidential candidates. The 
estimations suggest that identifying with a political party decreases vote intention 
for such candidates. We also report a modest effect for not voting in past elections 
(only in the second model at the p<0.05 level), while documenting no substantial 
differences deriving from an interest in politics. 
Hence, the results show that support for alternative presidential candidates 
functions as a vote against the party system establishment. After all, the rise of 
alternative presidential candidates coincides with a striking decrease in ideologi-
cal and partisan attachments. In this vein, the unattached nature of alternative 
presidential candidate supporters insinuates the presence of critical citizens who 
channel their discontent electorally–despite not necessarily having voted in more 
significant numbers in the past.
For the third hypothesis, we tested whether economic vote variables condition 
support for alternative presidential candidates. We report a statistically significant 
effect of prospective pocketbook economic views across models and national eco-
nomic outlooks in the full model. The results indicate that supporters of alternative 
presidential candidates positively view the general economic situation but are pes-
simistic about their future financial situation. Therefore, individuals who vote for 
alternative presidential candidates appropriately distinguish between the national 
and pocketbook economic conditions–and distinctly worry about their economic 
prospects.
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The fourth hypothesis addresses socio-demographic shifts. We anticipated 
that younger individuals and individuals with lower education levels vote for alter-
native presidential candidates in more significant numbers. Our findings indicate 
that alternative presidential candidates are more popular among younger vot-
ers. The more substantial support for alternative presidential candidates among 
younger voters reflects the decay of attachment to traditional coalitions. In other 
words, younger voters have not developed the same electoral attachments as old-
er voters and, consequently, are more inclined to vote for alternative presidential 
candidates.
The estimations also reveal that individuals with higher education levels are 
more prone to support alternative presidential candidates. We formulated this 
hypothesis with the comparative literature in mind, which often discusses how 
low-income segments have fueled political outsiders’ rise elsewhere. In the case 
of Chile, individuals with higher education levels drive support for non-traditional 
presidential candidates.
In sum, the statistical output suggests that specific segments of Chilean vot-
ers support alternative presidential candidates. This subgroup of the population is 
younger and has higher education levels. These individuals also identify less ideo-
logically and with political parties. Furthermore, they suffer from economic anxie-
ty–viewing the economy as performing well for others while remaining pessimistic 
about their financial prospects.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we analyzed growing support for alternative presidential candi-
dates in Chile; a country once praised for its stability that, in recent election cycles, 
has shown signs of realignment and declining level of electoral participation. We 
summarize our findings into two conclusions.
First, alternative presidential candidates’ growing popularity coincides with 
increasing political fragmentation –as evidenced in the effective number of candi-
dates– and a steady fall in electoral turnout, partisan, and ideological attachments. 
Second, the main individual-level determinants of support for alternative presiden-
tial candidates are ideological, partisan, economic, and socio-demographic. Tradi-
tional left-right ideological and partisan attachments decrease vote intention for 
alternative presidential candidates. This outcome points to the anti-establishment 
feeling driving their support. The fact that voter registration has been automatic 
since 2012 and voting is optional might have induced some people who previously 
chose not to register to vote to cast ballots for alternative presidential candidates 
now that they are automatically enfranchised. 
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Followers of alternative presidential candidates also suffer from economic 
anxiety, as they perceive the general economic situation in a positive light but are 
pessimistic about their future finances. This finding points to voting for alternative 
candidates as a potential expression of a protest vote against the political estab-
lishment for economic reasons. Concurrently, younger individuals and those with 
higher education levels are also more likely to vote for alternative candidates, an 
evidence that is consistent with the claim that declining partisanship responds to 
a generational effect, with more educated new voters being less likely to support 
candidates from the traditional coalitions. 
The rise of alternative presidential candidates –mavericks, outsiders, or rep-
resentatives of minor parties– in Latin American democracies is associated with 
political discontent and weakening party systems. In Chile, where alternative 
presidential candidates have grown considerably in popularity, the once institu-
tionalized party system shows signs of decay and realignment. By examining the 
individual-level determinants of support for alternative presidential candidates, 
we hope to shed light on the features that fuel their rise in Chile and beyond.
Alternative presidential candidates come in all shapes and sizes. The case of 
Chile, a country with a weakening but still institutionalized party system, shows 
some interesting commonalities in the bases of support for alternative candidates. 
While economic anxiety and lack of deep political attachments make Chile similar 
to other Latin American countries, the results stemming from the youth and high 
education levels driving support for alternative presidential candidates provide a 
path for researchers to expand in future studies.
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